



International Monetary Fund



Martine Guerguil
Deputy Director, Fiscal Affairs Department

Unemployment remains stubbornly high





What we know about multipliers

Targeted fiscal measures

Making place for labor market reforms


What we know about multipliers


Targeted fiscal measures

Making space for labor market reforms

There is no single fiscal multiplier


First-year fiscal multipliers from literature survey






Determinants of the size of output multiplier






There is no single employment multiplier

Advanced Economies: Estimates of Okun Coefficients (annual data, 1980-2011)



Impact of expenditure- and revenue-based consolidations on employment




What we know about multipliers

Targeted fiscal measures


Making space for labor market reforms

Tax wedges can adversely affect employment




Fiscal instruments can be targeted to foster employment

Impact on Employment Growth of a Cut in Employer Social **Security Contribution Cuts Targeted to the Youth**



Impact on Employment Growth of a Cut in Employer **Social Security Contribution Targeted to the Elderly**



Design matters (based on case studies)


- Targeting the low-paid and youth has been associated with better labor market outcomes than targeting very specific disadvantaged socioeconomic groups (e.g. long-term unemployed or specific regions).
- Targeting all workers within a specific group—regardless of employment status, employer size, and contract type—creates fewer distortions (e.g. tax cuts for "new" jobs inefficient).
- A calibrated reduction of employer SSC within a well-defined range has been more effective when targeting the low-paid than a single threshold (creating a "low-pay" trap).
- Clarity in design and low administrative costs are important.
- Targeted tax credits have been used in some countries that want to preserve the link between social security contributions and benefits.


What we know about multipliers

Targeted fiscal measures

Making place for labor market reforms


Labor market reforms can have large direct fiscal costs






Fiscal policy can mitigate the distributive effect of structural reforms






Finland: Tighter Employment Protection versus Labor Tax Cuts



Implications of a two-handed approach to reforms



Key assumptions: Objective is to fully offset GDP losses related to reforms


Effectiveness of fiscal policy

- Fiscal multiplier: 1.25 declining to zero after 5 years
- High hysteresis: 0.2
- Low hysteresis: 0.02

Transitory cost of labor reforms

- High: WEO (2004)
- Low: OECD (2011)


Implications of two-handed approach to reforms




How much fiscal support to provide? Key considerations

- Access to financing at a reasonable cost is available, and policy credibility is present to ensure the deficit widening is perceived as temporary.
 - Low mutiplier/high borrowing costs are likely otherwise
- Strong reform commitment is present.
 - Preferable for any fiscal offset to include explicit "sunset clauses".
 - More effective social safety nets as alternative?
- Estimates of reforms benefits should err on the conservative side due to the related high uncertainty.
 - The case for budget support is stronger when costs are well identified in size and time

Thank you!





http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/tnm/2014/tnm1404.pdf

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2014/02/fmindex.htm